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UNIT 3: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
     Dr. David Montoya 
1.- Definition and function of collective agreements.  
1.1.- Definition of Collective Agreement. 
There is a legal concept of collective agreement in art. 82.1 WS, 
which defines it as the “expression of a agreement freely adopted by 
workers’ and employers’ representatives by virtue of their collective 
autonomy".  
There is also a concept in an international standard: Art. 2.1 of 
Recommendation nº 91 of the ILO (International Labour Organisation) 
of 1951 defines it as “any agreement in writing regarding working 
conditions and terms of employment concluded between an employer, a 
group of employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one 
hand, and one or more representative workers' organisations, or, in the 
absence of such organisations, the representatives of the workers duly 
elected and authorised by them in accordance with national laws and 
regulations, on the other”.  
The latter concept, however, only refers to the normative content 
of the agreement (working conditions) but not its obligational content 
(everything related to the agreement parties’ rights and obligations) 
which are usually included in collective agreements. Neither does it 
refer to the relationship between the employer and the workers’ 
representatives, which are also normally regulated by collective 
agreements.  
For these reasons, we can consider a doctrinal concept of the 
collective agreement and define it as "the written standard, arising from 
a bargaining process between employers or their representatives and 
workers’ representatives, aimed at regulating not only working 
conditions, but also the relationship between employers and workers’ 
representatives and between the signatories of the agreement ". 
Regarding the legal nature of the collective agreements, they 
include, both, features from the contracts and from the legal 
standards1. Hence they have been conceived as "a hybrid, with a the 
body of a contract and  the soul of law" (CARNELUTTI). 
 
 
                                                             
1 Whilst they stemmed from a negotiation process (as any contract), they also have, as legal standards,  
an overall personal scope and normative efficacy. 
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1.2.- Function of the collective agreement.  
 
Since the right to collective bargaining was recognised in the 
Constitution and implemented in the standards, the regulatory 
functions of the collective agreements have been broadened 
considerably. Originally, collective agreements were virtually confined to 
the regulation of working days and wages. Nowadays, besides regulating 
the various aspects of the employment relationship (working days, 
salary, reconciliation of work and family life,  prevention of labour risks, 
etc) they regulate economic issues (e.g. a company’s employment policy, 
or outsourcing policy) and those related to workers’ collective action 
(e.g. rights of workers' representatives, establishment of  union sections, 
workers’ right to assembly, etc).  
This historical trend towards boosting collective bargaining is also 
something of our own time. One can say that over the last twenty years 
the role of collective bargaining in the regulation of working conditions 
has changed to the point that nowadays it regulates aspects of labour 
relations before exclusively governed by law.  
Traditionally, collective bargaining has played the role of 
improving working conditions laid down in the rules of the respective 
mandatory law. This is a typical feature of the first manifestations of 
collective bargaining in history. However, nowadays collective 
bargaining continues to have a significant role (e.g. art. 38 WS provides 
a minimum of 30 calendar days’ holidays, which can be extended by the 
collective agreement).  
In fact, collective bargaining has gradually increased its 
regulatory role with respect to the law, and now has three functions 
more in addition to the above:  
1) Sometimes the law allows collective agreement to regulate 
certain matters, replacing non-mandatory standards (e.g. art. 14.1 WS -
duration of the qualifying period-, art. 29.1 WS -payslip model-).  
2) In other cases, the law partly regulates some matters, 
entrusting the collective agreement to complete the legal regulation;  
e.g. Art. 23.2 WS (entrusts the collective agreement to establish the 
terms for the exercise of some rights such as leave to sit examinations, 
as well as the option to choose work shifts for workers following 
courses.  
3) Also in other cases, the law chooses to enable the collective 
agreement to regulate some matter. In other words, the law merely 
mentions  said matter,  requiring the collective agreement to establish 
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all regulation;  e.g. Art. 24 WS (promotion scheme), Art. 25 WS (terms 
for economic development). 
2.- The constitutional right to collective bargaining. 
 The Spanish Constitution recognises the right to collective 
bargaining in art. 37.1: “The law shall guarantee the right to collective 
labour bargaining between workers and employers’ representatives, as 
well as the binding force of the collective agreements”. 
The most significant features of this regulation are the following:  
1.- Due to its position in the Constitution (section 2, Chapter II of 
Title I SC) it is a right provided with direct and immediate efficacy,  
therefore, it is directly enforceable in courts.  Furthermore, the 
regulation shall  only be regulated by an Act (“reserva de ley”) as 
stipulated in art. 53.1 Spanish Constitution.  
However, it is not a fundamental right but an ordinary 
constitutional right. Therefore, any breach cannot be challenged in 
“amparo” in the Constitutional Court. Nonetheless, the Constitutional 
Court has ruled that certain manifestations of collective bargaining are 
part of the essential content of the fundamental workers’ right to 
freedom of association (article. 28.1 SC). In this indirect way, the 
constitutional protection of the right could be claimed in amparo (as 
part of the right freely to join a trade union).  
Note that the Act regulating the workers’ right to freedom of 
association (the Organic Law 11/1985 on Right to Association)  
establishes the unions’ right to deploy union activity which includes the 
right to collective bargaining. In conclusion, it can be said that the 
unions’ right to collective bargaining is integral to the right of 
association. Nevertheless,  the right of collective bargaining of workers’ 
representatives in the workplace is not. Therefore, it is not entitled to 
the same constitutional protection.  
2.- Concerning the holders of the collective bargaining right, art. 
37.1 SC simply refers to them as “workers and employers’ 
representatives”.  
Consequently, it can be said that the Spanish Constitution sets 
out the right to collective bargaining in broad terms, since the 
constitutional provision suggests that any representative body of 
employers and employees can lawfully negotiate collective agreements.  
Nonetheless, while Title III of WS (arts. 82 to 92)  develops the 
constitutional order and   regulates the right to collective bargaining, it 
does not entitle any representative body of workers or employers to 
negotiate collective agreements since it establishes strict requirements 
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in order to attribute representatives’ legal standing for bargaining and 
certain procedure bargaining procedure.  
Therefore, although the SC attributes the right to collective 
bargaining to any employers and workers’ representatives, Title III of 
WS (arts. 87 and 88) only confers the right to negotiate collective 
agreements to some representative employers and employees’ bodies2 
and  subjects them to certain procedural rules (arts. 89 and 90 WS).  
Two possible conclusions can be reached from this divergence 
between art. 37.1 SC and Title III of WS:  
1) The WS Title III regulation on right to collective bargaining is 
unconstitutional because it unduly restricts the right to collective 
bargaining established by art. 37.1 SC.  
2) As long as neither appeal nor question of unconstitutionality 
has been raised against Title III of WS and considering that art. 37.1 SC 
has direct and immediate efficacy, our legal system shall admit two 
types of collective agreements:  
a) The so-called “estatutarios” collective agreements: those 
negotiated under the legal standing and procedural requirements laid 
down in Title III of the WS.  
b) The so-called “extraestautarios” collective agreements: those 
which have not been negotiated strictly following the WS’ Title III rules 
(legal standing and procedural rules for bargaining), but whose validity 
may be directly based on art. 37.1 SC.  
Since no appeal nor question of unconstitutionality has been 
raised against Title III of ET (and, at this stage, is unlikely to be raised), 
the latter is the position that has been broadly followed by case law and 
Labour Law scholars. In this regard, the Constitutional Court has 
stated that in our legal system the regulation of the constitutional right 
to collective bargaining has not been exhausted by the provisions of 
Title III of WS. Such provisions have only made a partial regulation of 
the right laid down by art. 37.1 EC.  
Interestingly, this conclusion  also seems to be followed by some 
articles of the WS which indirectly admit the possibility of negotiating 
collective agreements outside its rules. This indirect way of accepting 
“extraestatutaria” collective bargaining , may be deduced from two WS 
articles (arts. 82.3 and 90.1), which expressly refer to the "collective 
agreements governed by this law", making it implicit that other kind of 
collective agreements are legally feasible. 
                                                             
2 Only those who reach certain quotas of representation within the collective agreement scope. 
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3.- Interpretation of the expression "binding force" contained in art. 
37.1 EC. 
According to art. 37.1 SC, the law shall guarantee the "binding 
force of the collective agreement". The interpretation of this legal has 
been widely discussed by scholars and case law. Three possible 
interpretations have been considered:  
1) Binding force can be construed as a "duty of relative peace". 
Such duty means the obligation of workers’ representatives to not to go 
on strikes specifically aimed at claiming an amendment of the collective 
agreement. This duty has been laid down by Art. 11 c) of the Royal 
Decree Law 17/1977 of Industrial Relations (which is currently the 
basic regulatory standard for the right to strike). Article 11 of RDL 
17/1977 outlaws the so-called "strikes with amendment purposes” 
(huelgas novatorias), that is, those strikes aimed at altering a collective 
agreement while it is still in force. Moreover, the Constitutional Court 
(Constitutional Court ruling 11/1981) has upheld the constitutionality 
of the so called duty of relative peace regulated by art. 11 RDL 17/1977.  
2) Binding force can be construed as “normative legal efficacy” of 
collective agreements. This would mean that every collective agreement, 
no matter what type it is (estatutario or extraestatutario), would be 
considered in our system as legal standard (a source of Law) because 
that is the will of art. 37.1 SC.  
This is, precisely, the position which has been held by some 
Labour Law scholars and which was also underpinned by some 
Constitutional Court rulings laid down in the eighties, but later 
abandoned.  
3) Binding force can be construed as “normative legal efficacy” of 
collective agreements. Nevertheless, such legal efficacy is a plus that 
shall be attributed by ordinary law to collective agreements when 
establishing its regulation. That interpretation, which nowadays is 
being followed by most of scholars and case law rulings, is based on the 
wording of art. 37.1 EC: "the law shall guarantee the binding force of 
collective agreements." In short, according to this interpretation, art. 
37.1 SC entrusts the ordinary law (WS) to attribute this legal efficacy to 
the collective agreements which it is regulating. Therefore, the 
normative legal efficacy of the collective agreements does not stem from 
the Constitution, but the ordinary law. 
As a result of this interpretation of art. 37.1 SC, in our legal 
system, only collective agreements regulated by law (WS)3 shall have a 
                                                             
3 The so-called “estatutarios” collective agreements. 
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normative legal efficacy, whilst collective agreements which have not 
been negotiated according to law requirements established for collective 
bargaining4 are equally lawful but shall only have a contractual legal 
efficacy. 
 
3. - Collective agreements’ efficacy.  
In general, the role of the collective agreement within the legal 
system depends on two factors:  
1) The legal value attributed to it within the other sources of the 
legal system (that is to say its legal efficacy).  
2) The scope of individuals to whom it will be applied (its personal 
efficacy).  
3.1.- Legal efficacy.  
In Europe there are two models of collective agreements according 
to their legal efficacy or binding effects:  
1) Collective agreements with normative legal efficacy, i.e. the 
collective agreement as a source of Law.  
2) Collective agreements with contractual legal efficacy, i.e. the 
collective agreement as a common law contract.  
This distinction is important because the legal consequences that 
entail the existence of one or another model of collective agreement are 
quite different: In one case, the collective agreement shall be legally 
considered as a standard (and consequently as another source of Law) 
and, in the other case, it shall merely be considered as a contract.  
Which of these two models of collective agreement predominates 
in Europe?  
Recommendation Nº 91 of the ILO states that collective 
agreements shall have normative legal efficacy5. However, in Europe no 
model is predominant:  
                                                             
4 The so-called “extraestatutarios” collective agreements. 
5 According to art. 3 of the Recommendation nº 91: (1) Collective agreements should bind the 
signatories thereto and those on whose behalf the agreement is concluded. Employers and workers 
bound by a collective agreement should not be able to include in contracts of employment stipulations 
contrary to those contained in the collective agreement. (2) Stipulations in such contracts of 
employment which are contrary to a collective agreement should be regarded as null and void and 
automatically replaced by the corresponding stipulations of the collective agreement. (3) Stipulations in 
contracts of employment which are more favourable to the workers than those prescribed by a 
collective agreement should not be regarded as contrary to the collective agreement. 
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1) UK: Neither model prevails.  Collective agreements are 
"Gentlemen's agreements", which are neither binding nor enforceable by 
Courts. They only have a social or moral efficacy so that workers  may 
initiate industrial action or go on strike if their employers were in 
breach of the agreement.  
2) Italy: The agreements are contracts governed by the common 
law. However, they have certain normative effects because Italian law 
does not allow the stipulation of working conditions in employment 
contracts if inferior to those established in the collective agreement.  
3) Germany, France and Spain: Collective agreements have 
normative legal efficacy. However, as it will be seen in this lesson, in 
Spain there is also a special type of collective agreement (the so-called 
“convenio colectivo extraestatutario” to which the Supreme Court only 
attributes contractual legal efficacy (denying normative efficacy). 
3.2.- Personal efficacy. 
Regarding personal efficacy, two models of collective agreement 
can be recognised in Europe:  
1) Collective agreements with general or erga omnes personal 
efficacy. This means that the collective agreement shall apply to all 
employers and employees included within its personal scope and 
throughout its period of validity. That is precisely the case of the 
Spanish legal system, with the exception of the so-called 
“extraestatutario” collective agreements which, according to the 
Supreme Court, are only provided with a limited personal efficacy.  
2) Collective agreements with limited personal efficacy. This 
means that the collective agreement is not provided with erga omnes 
efficacy. They shall only apply to employers and employees directly 
represented by the signatories of the agreement. That is to say, the 
collective agreement will only be applied to the employers and 
employees who were associated or affiliated to the employers’ 
associations and unions that have negotiated and signed it. This is the 
case of Germany and Italy. In Spain, only extraestatutarios collective 
agreements have a limited personal efficacy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(4) If effective observance of the provisions of collective agreements is secured by the parties thereto, 
the provisions of the preceding subparagraphs should not be regarded as calling for legislative 
measures. 
4. The stipulations of a collective agreement should apply to all workers of the classes concerned 
employed in the undertakings covered by the agreement unless the agreement specifically provides to 
the contrary. 
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4.- Collective agreement types. 
4.1.- Estatutario collective agreements and the so-called 
extraestatutario collective agreements. 
As previously mentioned, according to art. 37.1 of the Spanish 
Constitution (as it has been construed by the Constitutional Court), the 
Title III of the WS has not exhausted the constitutional mandate to 
regulate collective bargaining, considering that such right is recognised 
by the Constitution in very broad terms. For this reason, our legal 
system has the peculiarity of having two types of collective agreements: 
estatutarios collective agreements (grounded in art 37.1 of the Spanish 
Constitution and Title III of the WS Act) and extraestatutarios collective 
agreements (grounded solely in art. 37.1 of the Spanish Constitution).  
A) Definition.  
 As mentioned above, estatutarios collective agreements are those 
negotiated under strict legal standing and procedural rules laid down in 
Title III of WS (arts. 82-92 WS) for collective bargaining and, therefore, 
are based on that legal provision6.  
Meanwhile, extraestautarios collective agreements are those that 
have been negotiated not following strictly the legal standing or the 
procedural rules laid down in Title III of WS, but whose validity is based 
on art. 37.1 of the Spanish Constitution, since such a constitutional 
right has direct and immediate efficacy according to art. 53.1 of the S.C.  
   According to case law, each type of collective agreement has a 
different legal status. Their legal and personal efficacy is completely 
different. Let us analyse it.  
B) Legal and personal efficacy of the estatutario collective 
agreement.  
1) Legal efficacy.  
Case law and scholars conclude that such collective agreements 
have normative efficacy. This means that, in our legal system, such 
collective agreements are a source of Law and, consequently, they have 
to be considered as a legal standard.  
There are several major consequences arising from the normative 
legal  efficacy of the estatutarios collective agreements that deserve to be 
mentioned: 
                                                             
6 In other words, such collective agreements are those concluded following the WSrules governing the 
parties’ representativeness, the bargaining process,  the written form, and their registration and 
publication by the Administration. They are negotiated by employers and employees’ representatives 
who accrue a certain level of representativeness.  
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- The collective agreement follows the same rules as any other 
source of Law. It creates substantive law for employers and employees 
as any other standard of general application. Consequently its 
provisions are imperatively and automatically applied to labour 
relations, with no need to incorporate them into the contract of 
employment.  
- The rights recognized by the collective agreement cannot be 
waived by the employees.  
- The contract of employment cannot establish less favourable 
terms for the employees than those stipulated by the collective 
agreement. Otherwise, such contractual provisions shall be deemed null 
and void.  
- The collective agreement, as a legal standard, shall necessarily 
be published in the appropriate Official Bulletin of the territory (State, 
Autonomous Region or Province).  
- The collective agreement is subjected to the principles of 
hierarchy and modernity.  
- The ruling that breaches the content of the collective agreement 
may be appealed on the grounds of the infringement of legal  rules.  
- Employers’ acts breaching the collective agreement may be 
administratively or criminally pursued as the infringement of labour 
legal standards.  In other words, a breach of the collective agreement by 
the employer may cause his administrative or criminal liability. 
The basis of the legal efficacy of the estatutario collective 
agreement lies in art. 37.1 of the SC ("the law shall guarantee ... the 
binding force of the collective agreements").  
2) Personal efficacy. 
Case law and scholars attribute to estatutario collective 
agreements a general or erga omnes efficacy. This means that such 
collective agreements are binding on all employers and employees 
included within their scope of application and throughout the entire 
time of their validity.  
The basis of the erga omnes personal efficacy of the estatutario 
collective agreement lies in art. 82.3 WS ("the collective agreements 
regulated by this Law are binding on all employers and employees 
included within their scope of application, throughout the entire time of 
their validity"). 
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C) Legal and personal efficacy of the extraestatutario collective 
agreement.  
1) Legal efficacy. 
The Supreme Court and most scholars deny normative efficacy to 
the extraestatutario collective agreements, so they only recognise them 
as a contractual status. This means that, in our legal system, such 
agreements have a contractual nature and, consequently, shall be 
legally treated as contracts not as legal standards.  
The legal implications of the contractual nature of the 
extraestatutarios collective agreements are, mainly, the following: 
  - The collective agreement is not a source of Law. It  does not 
create substantive law for employers and employees but only subjective 
rights and obligations for its signatories. Accordingly, its provisions are 
not imperatively nor automatically applied to labour relations unless 
such content is incorporated in the contract of employment by an 
agreement between the employer and the employee.  
- The rights recognised in the collective agreement can be legally 
waived by the employee.  
- The contract of employment may contain worse terms for the 
employees than those included in the collective agreement because the 
latter does not act as a minimum standard to be respected.  
- The collective agreement shall not be necessarily published in 
the Official Bulletin of the territory which it covers.  
- The collective agreement is not subjected to the principles of 
hierarchy and modernity.  
- The ruling that breaches the content of the collective agreement 
cannot be appealed on the grounds ofthe infringement of legal standards.  
- The entrepreneur’s acts violating the agreement  do not 
constitute infringement of  labour standards and therefore  cannot be 
administratively or criminally punished as such. As there will only be a 
contractual liability, it will simply be compensated by payment of 
damages. 
- Employers’ acts breaching the collective agreement cannot be 
administratively or criminally pursued  on the grounds of infringement 
of labour legal standards.  In other words, the breach of the collective 
agreement by the employer cannot cause his administrative or criminal 
liability. It can only result in the employer’s contractual liability and the 
employee’s right to claim compensation for the damages caused.  
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2) Personal efficacy. 
Extraestatutario collective agreements have a limited personal 
efficacy (not erga omnes). This means that they  can only be applied to 
employers and employees directly represented by the bargaining parties 
of the agreement. Consequently they shall only be applied, on the one 
hand, to the employers associated to the employers’ associations who 
have negotiated the agreement, and, on the other hand, to the 
employees affiliated to the unions who have negotiated the agreement.  
Nevertheless, when the collective agreement has been  negotiated 
in a company or at a lower level (company bargaining), the effects of its 
limited personal efficacy will not be observed when it has been 
negotiated by the works’ council or the personnel delegates because all 
the company’s employees are represented by such bodies. However, 
when the collective agreement is negotiated by a particular union 
section in the company, it will only be applied to those employees who 
are affiliated to such union.  
Despite its limited personal efficacy, the extraestatutario collective 
agreements can have a wider personal scope. Employers often invite 
unaffiliated workers to adhere individually to such collective agreement 
terms. This is usually carried out by employers to avoid the need to 
apply different work conditions to employees depending on whether or 
not they are affiliated to the union who signed the agreement. 
Employers also do this to avoid conflicts within the staff due to 
comparative harm, or to prevent mass affiliation of employees to the 
union which signed the agreement. 
Adhesion to the collective agreement terms can be  expressed or 
implied (the employer begins to apply the terms of the collective 
agreement with the employee’s acquiescence). Regardless of the 
situation, case law requires the adhesion to be clear and explicit.  
The basis for the limited efficacy of the extraestatutario collective 
agreement lies in a sensu contrario interpretation of art. 82.3 WS. 
 
4.2.- The so-called “framework collective agreements” and 
“collective agreements on specific matters”. 
 As mentioned above, the main purpose of the collective 
agreement is to establish the working conditions that will determine the 
labour relations within a certain scope. Yet, social partners (trade 
unions and employers’ associations) may also collectively agree on 
certain rules that will organise or govern collective bargaining.  In 
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general terms, this is, precisely, the main function performed by the so-
called “Framework Collective Agreements”.  
Framework collective agreements constitute another 
manifestation of collective bargaining, and therefore, have the same 
nature and legal treatment as collective agreements (Art. 83.3 ET). They 
are regulated by art. 83.2 WS. Framework Convention for collective 
agreements is not intended to set working terms, but the rules for  
future bargaining at lower levels. In this sense, scholars usually call 
them " bargaining agreements" because they are higher-level collective 
agreements that set the structure of the collective bargaining at lower 
levels.  
According to art. 83.2 WS, it can be deduced that there are two 
types of framework collective agreements. On the one hand, what 
scholars call, “proper framework collective agreements” (they are the 
"inter-professional agreements", negotiated statewide –signed at a 
national level- or for an Autonomous Region, which are referred to by 
the first paragraph of art: 83.2 WS). On the other hand, the so-called 
“improper or mixed framework collective agreements” (they are the 
“sectoral collective agreements" negotiated statewide or at an 
Autonomous Region level, which are referred to by the second 
paragraph of art. 83.2 WS).  
1) Proper framework collective agreements are inter-professional 
agreements (they apply to all sectors of production of the State or the 
Autonomous Regions), negotiated and signed by the most representative 
unions and employers’ associations at a national level or for an 
Autonomous Region, which aim solely to set  the rules that will govern 
collective bargaining in lower areas (agreements for bargaining). 
Consequently, such collective agreements do not set working 
conditions. 
Notice that such agreements can only be negotiated by the most 
representative trade unions and employer’s associations of the State or 
the Autonomous Region. Therefore, these agreements are necessarily 
statewide (negotiated at a national level) or shall have an Autonomous 
Region scope.  
An  example of this kind of collective framework agreement is the 
"Agreement II for employment and collective bargaining 2012, 2013 and 
2014"7 signed on January 25, 2012 between CEOE, CEPYME, on the 
side of the employers, and UGT and CCOO, on the side of the workers.  
                                                             
7 II Acuerdo para el Empleo y la Negociación Colectiva 2012,2013 y 2014. 
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2) Improper or mixed framework collective agreements are 
ordinary collective agreements, that are necessarily negotiated at State 
or at an Autonomous Region level, which, besides regulating working 
conditions in a certain production sector (construction, agriculture, 
cement, etc.), also set the terms for collective bargaining at lower 
bargaining units.  
A good example of this kind of collective agreement is the V 
National Collective Agreement for Temporary Work Agencies, whose art. 
1 establishes the structure of collective bargaining in the sector of 
temporary work, stating that it must be composed of statewide or 
Autonomous Region bargaining units (therefore, it excludes the 
negotiation of agreements on lower bargaining units such as provincial 
ones). In addition, this collective agreement provides that, in case of 
conflict between statewide and Autonomous Regions agreements, the 
statewide ones will prevail.  
Finally, notice also that Framework collective agreements (no 
matter which type they are) play two roles, according to art. 83.2 WS:  
 a) Firstly, to lay down the structure of the collective bargaining at 
lower bargaining units (e.g. they can lawfully ban the conclusion of 
collective agreements at certain bargaining units).  
b) Secondly, to set the rules to resolve  conflicts between collective 
agreements from different areas. As we will see in this lesson, despite 
the fact that there is a general rule banning the concurrence of 
collective agreements (art. 84 ET), framework collective agreements may 
allow it, by setting rules aimed at its resolution. For example, the 
framework collective agreement can solve concurrence conflicts 
applying the principle of modernity (by enforcing the most recent 
collective agreement ), the principle of favour (the collective agreement 
containing a more favourable regulation shall be applied) or the 
principle of specialty (the collective agreement containing a more 
specific regulation shall be applied), among other possible solutions.  
Agreements on certain matters  
This type of collective agreements is referred to in art. 83.3 WS, 
which states that such collective agreements shall be entitled to the 
same treatment accorded by the Law to collective agreements.  Similarly 
to framework collective agreements, agreements on certain matters are 
resolved by most representative unions and employers’ associations at a 
national or Autonomous Region level. Therefore, their scope can cover 
any of these two territories.  
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Its object is to regulate certain relevant matters, typically 
governed by such agreements, in the territory of the State or an 
Autonomous Region. The following are examples of such agreements:  
IV National Agreement on Continuous Training8 of 01-02-2006, signed 
by CEOE and CEPYME, on the one hand, and UGT and CCOO, on the 
other. V National Agreement on Collective Labour Disputes Resolution9, 
of 07-02-2012 (BOE 23-02-2012), signed by the same subjects. V 
Valencian Autonomous Region Collective Agreement on Collective 
Labour Disputes Resolution10, of 02-06-2010 (DOCV 08-07-2010), 
signed by CIERVAL, UGT and CCOO-PV.  
 
4.3.- Workforce agreements. 
1.- Definition. 
Workforce agreements are another expression of  collective 
bargaining. They are negotiated between the company and the workers' 
representatives (union representatives, work  councils, personnel 
delegates11) to adapt certain employment conditions (working hours, 
salary, functions, etc) to the prevailing circumstances. In fact, it is not 
unusual  for WS to  entrust workforce agreements to regulate  certain   
issues regarding labour relations.   
2. - Background. 
The origin of such collective agreements is found in the 1994 
labour legislation reform. Such reform introduced in WS a brand-new 
bargaining product, the workforce agreement, through which the 
employer and the employees’ representatives can reach agreements  
including a broad range of important issues  in order to adapt the 
employment conditions to its circumstances.  
3.- Types.  
Depending on their relationship with the applicable collective 
agreement, scholars distinguish three kinds of workforce agreements: 
replacement agreements, alternation agreements and opt out 
agreements.  
1) Replacement workforce agreements.  
They can be negotiated whenever the WS entrusts the regulation 
of any issue to the collective agreement and, in its absence, to a 
                                                             
8 IV Acuerdo Nacional de Formación Continua. 
9 V Acuerdo sobre Solución Autónoma de Conflictos Laborales (sistema extrajudicial). 
10 V Acuerdo de Solución Extrajudicial de Conflictos Laborales de la Comunidad Valenciana. 
11 Or the “informal representatives” appointed ad hoc by the entire workforce of the plant or 
undertaking affected in each case (see art. 41.4 WS). 
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workforce agreement.  Thus, this kind of workforce agreement shall only 
be negotiated when there is no relevant applicable collective agreement 
or, if such an agreement did exist, when this collective agreement does 
not stipulate anything concerning such issues.  
WS provides this kind of workplace agreement in order to regulate 
a wide range of matters. For example:  
- Article 22.1 WS: Establishing the employees’ professional 
classification system.  
- Article 24.1 WS: Setting the promotion system.  
- Article 29.1 WS: Providing an alternative payslip form besides 
the one established by the Ministry of Labour.  
- Article 34.2 WS: Establishing an irregular distribution of the 
working day throughout the year.  
- Article 34.3 WS: Establishing the distribution of the working 
day.  
2) Alternation workforce agreements.  
They can be negotiated whenever the WS entrusts both, the 
collective agreement and the workforce agreement equally, to regulate 
certain issues. In this case, either the collective agreement or the 
workplace agreement can lawfully regulate suchmatters.  
There is only one example of this kind of workplace agreement in 
the WS: The art. 31.1 WS when it states that the month for paying the 
second bonus or extraordinary payment can be established by either 
the collective agreement or the workplace agreement. 
One could raise the question of which instrument would be 
applicable (the collective agreement or the workplace agreement) if such 
second bonus payment were established by both.  In my opinion, two 
possible solutions could be contemplated: 1) the art. 84 WS prohibition 
of concurrence could be applied and, thus, the agreement which was 
reached first will prevail.; or 2) To apply the principle of more favourable 
rule, regulated by art. 3.3 WS, and, thus, the regulation providing better 
overall conditions would prevail.  
3) Opt out workplace agreements. 
They can be negotiated whenever the WS entrusts the employer 
and the employees’ representatives, through the negotiation of a 
workplace agreement, to opt out from some of the  provisions 
established by the collective agreement applicable  on a particular 
issue. In this case, the role played by the workplace agreement is to 
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waive some of the regulations of the collective agreement in order to 
adapt it to the undertaking circumstances.  
This kind of workplace agreements is contemplated in art. 82.3 
WS.  
4. - Legal and personal efficacy.  
There is no provision in the WS for the legal and personal efficacy 
of the workplace agreements. However, scholars tend to recognise them 
as agreements with the same efficacy as the ordinary collective 
agreements (estatutario collective agreements). Mainly due to the fact 
that the workplace agreements are negotiated by the same subjects 
empowered by art. 87 WS to negotiate collective agreements at a 
company level. On the other hand, workplace agreements play an 
equivalent role in regulating working conditions within the undertaking. 
 
4.4.- Other collective agreements. 
In the Spanish legal system, besides the main manifestations of 
the collective bargaining (estatutarios and extraestatutarios collective 
agreements, framework agreements, agreements on specific matters and 
workplace agreements), there are other manifestations of the collective 
bargaining that deserve to be mentioned: the agreements achieved 
through mediation and arbitral awards.  
Agreements achieved through mediation and arbitral awards.  
Our legal system provides different extrajudicial procedures aimed 
at reaching legal settlements on collective labour disputes. A typical 
collective labour dispute is the one which is related to the interpretation 
and application of the collective agreement. Consequently, the WS 
establishes extrajudicial mechanisms for settling collective disputes 
arising from the interpretation and application of collective agreements. 
These legal procedures also operate to resolve individual disputes if the 
parties submit to them.  
Art. 91.2 WS entrusts framework collective agreements (proper or 
improper) and agreements on specific matters to regulate extrajudicial 
mechanisms to solve collective labour disputes arising from the 
interpretation and application of collective agreements. This is the case 
of the aforementioned V National Agreement on Collective Labour 
Disputes Resolution, which regulates mediation and arbitration 
procedures.  
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What is most important is the legal value attributed by the law to 
the settlement reached through mediation or arbitration. . Concerning 
this, art. 91 WS states the following:  
 1) Agreements reached through mediation and arbitration awards 
shall be entitled to the same legal processing as the estatutario 
collective agreements12. This implies that the settlement and the 
arbitration award must be in writing and must be registered with the 
Labour Authority, which must order its official publication in the 
Official Bulletin corresponding to the territory covered by the agreement 
or the arbitration ruling.  
2) Mediation agreements and arbitration awards shall be entitled 
to the same legal effect as the estatutarios collective agreements13. 
3) Mediation agreements and arbitration awards  shall be 
subjected to challenge on the same grounds and procedures 
contemplated by Law for the collective agreements. 
 
5.- “Estatutario” collective agreements. 
5.1.- Negotiation units and scope of the collective agreement. 
A slight difference should be made between the concepts of 
“bargaining unit” and “collective agreement scope” because they are 
fairly close but not necessarily the same. The bargaining unit is the area 
from which the collective agreement is negotiated (e.g. agriculture in the 
province of Alicante).  
On the other hand, the scope of the collective agreement is the 
area covered by the collective agreement, so the area in which the 
collective agreement shall be applied (e.g. all companies who run 
business of fresh tomato packaging and labeling in the province of 
Alicante). The bargaining parties shall freely determine the scope of the 
collective agreement. Hence, art. 83.1 WS rules that "collective 
agreements shall have the scope of application that was agreed upon by 
the parties."  
In fact, the scope of application  of any collective agreement is 
formed by its functional, territorial and personal scope.  
                                                             
12 Provided that those who adopted the agreement or endorsed the arbitration compromise enjoy 
thelegitimacy required, by art. 87, 88 y 89 WS, enabling them to negotiate a collective agreement within 
the scope of the dispute. Otherwise, they would have the effectiveness of an extraestatutario collective 
agreement. 
 
. 
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- The functional scope refers to the production units where the 
collective agreement shall be applied. It may be a workplace, a whole 
company, a group of companies or a sector or subsector of the 
production.  
- The territorial scope refers to the geographic space in which the 
collective agreement shall be applied. It could be a locality, one or 
several provinces, the State or the territory of an Autonomous Region.  
- Finally, the personal scope implies the group of employers and 
employees who will be affected by the collective agreement. It can be 
applied to all employees of the functional and territorial scope of the 
collective agreement or, instead, be just restricted to certain groups or 
categories of workers. In fact, the latter has been supported by case law.  
In this case what we have is the so-called “collective agreement for a 
group” or, in Spanish, “convenios colectivos de grupo o convenios franja” 
(e.g. collective agreement negotiated only for  airline pilots).  
 At the same time, case law allows the exclusion of certain 
categories of workers, such as management personnel, provided that 
these groups have enough bargaining power to negotiate their own 
collective agreement. For this reason, case law has rejected excluding 
lawfully fixed-term and part-time employees from the personal scope of 
the collective agreement because this could mean a breach of the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination.  
As has been stated above, the parties are free to agree on the 
scope of the collective agreement (Art. 83.1 ET). However, in practice 
they are bound to respect the following limits:  
1) The bargaining legal standing rules established by arts. 87 and 
88 WS. It is clear that the negotiating parties cannot lawfully determine 
a scope for a group of workers which they do not  represent (e.g. The 
union of airline pilots  cannot lawfully negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement for the building sector).  
2) Another limit is what case law calls “ the nature of things”. It 
means that the functional scope of the agreement must be sensible and 
not arbitrary, in the sense that companies or subsectors with different 
features must not be included in a single collective agreement scope. 
This is mainly due to the fact that different sectors or companies which 
run different businesses cannot fall under the same working conditions. 
For example, case law has refused to include photocopying and graphic 
arts business in the same collective agreement.  
3) Finally, as mentioned above, the principles of equality and non-
discrimination prevent excluding from the personal scope of the 
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collective agreement those groups of employees who do not have 
representatives who could negotiate their own collective agreement (e.g. 
fixed-term and part-time employees). 
 
5.2.- The structure of collective bargaining. Concurrence of 
collective agreements.  
 
A) Legal regulation and concept.  
The legal regulation of the occurrence of collective agreements can 
be found in art. 84 WS, a provision that, in short, contains a general 
rule (concurrence banning) and some exceptions to this general rule. 
According to art. 84.1 WS: "During its term, a collective agreement must 
not be affected by what is set forth in agreements of a different scope, 
barring….”. 
The concurrence of collective agreements arises when two or more 
conventions share its scope, resulting in a conflict between two or more 
agreed standards.  
B) Types of concurrence.  
In practice, two kind of concurrence may arise:  
1) Concurrence by inclusion: the scope of a collective agreement 
already falls into the scope of another one. For example, while a 
statewide collective agreement for textile business is in force, another 
textile collective agreement is settled but with a provincial territorial 
scope.  
2) Concurrence by intersection: two or more collective agreements 
partially share their scope. For example, while the national collective 
agreement on tax offices is in force, a provincial collective agreement on 
offices is negotiated and approved (both collective agreements would be 
applicable in the sector of tax offices in the province of Alicante ). 
Another example would arise if while the collective agreement on 
agriculture of the Valencian Autonomous Region is in force, an 
interprovincial agriculture collective agreement for the south east of 
Spain (for the provinces of Almeria, Murcia and Alicante) comes into 
force.  
C) General banning rule.  
Art. 84 WS contains a general rule which bans collective 
agreements concurrence: "During its term, a collective agreement must 
not be affected by what is set forth in agreements of a different scope “. 
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What is the base for such legal provision? This rule is aimed at 
ensuring the efficacy of the collective agreement and preventing later 
negotiators to waive what has been collectively agreed by earlier 
negotiators.  
Concerning this legal banning, at least three issues might be 
pointed out:  
1) The ban continues while the collective agreement is still in 
force. Consequently, once the collective agreement is terminated by 
formal repudiation of either of the parties who negotiated it, they can 
lawfully negotiate a new collective agreement without breaching such 
ban.  
2) To "affect" shall be construed as fully or partly modifying an 
existing collective agreement but not regulating issues that have not 
been covered by the first collective agreement.  In other words, it is 
completely lawful and respectful with the concurrence ban to negotiate 
a new collective agreement regulating matters not covered by the 
former.  
3) The concurrence ban is inserted in Title III of the WS, therefore 
it only affects the so-called estatutario collective agreements, not the 
extraestatutarios.  
D) Exceptions to the general rule.  
Art. 84 WS contemplates several exceptions to the above 
mentioned banning general rule. In fact, there are four exceptions in 
which such prohibition shall not be applied:  
1) Framework collective agreements (either proper or improper 
ones but always negotiated statewide or for an Autonomous Region) can 
lawfully allow collective agreements concurrence.  
As mentioned above, art. ET 83.2 WS provides that Framework 
collective agreements (either proper or improper ones but always 
negotiated statewide or for an Autonomous Region) play the role of 
establishing the structure of collective bargaining and solve 
concurrence conflicts that may occur at lower levels. This means that, 
the framework collective agreement may allow concurrence situations 
setting rules for their solution (e.g. applying the prior or the later 
agreement, applying the lower level or the upper level one, etc).  
2) Case law has ruled that the concurrence banning may be 
lawfully waived by any collective agreement because such prohibition is 
non-mandatory law. Consequently, a collective agreement may allow 
subsequent ones to prevail in case of concurrence (E.g a statewide 
sectoral collective agreement allows bargaining at a province level). The 
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basis of this criterion lies in the fact that, in these cases, there is  no 
conflict between collective agreements because,  either way, the will of 
the former negotiators is applied.  
3) 2012 Labour reform introduced a new and major exception to 
the concurrence banning which seeks to promote collective bargaining 
at a company level and to promote flexible adaptation of the working 
conditions in each undertaking.  
Under this exception, contemplated in art. 84.2 WS, any company 
can lawfully negotiate its own collective agreement while an upper level 
one (a sectoral collective agreement) is in force. In this case, the latter 
collective agreement will prevail but only regarding the following 
matters: 
- Salary rates, including overtime and shift work compensation.  
- Work schedule, distribution of working time, shift work 
regulation and planning of annual holidays.  
- Company’s adaptation of the professional classification system. 
- Company’s adaptation of the features of the contracts of 
employment which WS entrusts to companies’ collective agreements.  
- Reconciliation of work and family life.  
- Any other matters established in framework collective 
agreements.  
Note that, according to art. 84. 2 WS, the above list is open for 
framework collective agreements, so they may extend it by adding more 
matters that can be regulated by companies’ collective agreements 
without breaching the concurrence banning. 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the framework agreements 
can either lawfully waive this exception, through a banning rule, or 
reduce the list of matters mentioned above. This is because the last 
paragraph of art. 84.2 WS states that "the collective agreements which 
are referred to in article 83.2 WS (framework collective agreements) can 
not waive the application priority regulated in this section". Thus, the 
legal nature of art. 84.2 WS rule, which eases collective bargaining at 
the company level, is mandatory.  
4) Finally, art. 84.3 WS contemplates a forth exception to the 
concurrence banning. According to it, at an Autonomous Region level 
collective agreements affecting a statewide one can be negotiated. For 
example, while a national textile collective agreement is in force, 
another one could be negotiated in any of the 17 Spanish Autonomous 
Regions.  
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Nevertheless, this legal exception requires the following two 
conditions to be applicable:  
a) Firstly, the decision to negotiate a new collective agreement, at 
a regional level, concurring with another previously negotiated statewide 
shall have the support of the majorities required to constitute the 
negotiation commission in the pertinent negotiation unit. Therefore, 
such decision shall be supported by the absolute majority of each of the 
representations that will negotiate the regional collective agreement 
(trade unions and business associations). 
b) Secondly, the regional collective agreement shall not regulate 
certain matters which must be considered non-negotiable items at this 
level: qualifying period, contractual arrangements, professional groups, 
annual maximum working hours, disciplinary regime, geographical 
mobility and minimum standards on safety and health at work.  
The basis of this exception is to ease regional decentralisation of  
collective bargaining, with the exception of the above mentioned major 
matters in which the WS makes the statewide collective agreements 
prevailing.  
The origin of this exception is in the 1994 labour reform. In fact, it 
stems from a political agreement with the Basque nationalist parties 
who sought to allow negotiation of collective agreements at a regional 
level while statewide ones were in force.  
Note that, unlike the previous exception to the concurrence 
prohibition, here art. 84.3 ET WS configures this rule as non-
mandatory. This is because an opposite regulation could be established 
by a framework collective agreement (proper or improper), according to 
which negotiating a collective agreement could be banned at an 
Autonomous Region level while a statewide one is still in force.  
E) How shall the concurrence conflicts be solved?  
As seen above, art. 84 WS bans collective agreement concurrence 
but does not give any indication about how standards conflicts could be 
solved if they occur.  
Supreme Court case law has ruled that, in case of concurrence, 
the former collective agreement shall prevail over the previous one, so 
the latter collective agreement shall not be applied until the  expiry of 
the previous one. In other words, the latter collective agreement shall 
not be declared null and void but simply inapplicable (with no effect).  
This solution is based on the grounds that, in spite of not being 
expressly contemplated in art. 84 WS, it can be said that it is implicit in 
its regulation. Otherwise, the target sought by the prohibition of 
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concurrence (to prevent subsequent negotiators modifying what has 
been previously agreed) could be easily waived.  
 
5.3.- Collective agreement content. 
Art. 85 WS contemplates, on the one hand, the matters that may 
be regulated by the collective agreement and, on the other, the 
minimum or compulsory content of any collective agreement.  
1. - Matters that may be regulated by the collective agreement.  
According to art. 85.1 WS, the regulatory content of the collective 
agreement can be extremely wide.  Such article states that “according to 
the Law” collective agreements may regulate:  
 1) Matters of economic, labour and union nature and, in general, 
any other matters affecting working conditions. 
 2) Matters affecting the relationship between employees and their 
representatives and employer and employers’ associations, including 
the procedures for solving the disagreements arising during the 
consultation periods contemplated in arts. 40, 41, 47 and 51 WS. 
 Therefore two kinds of content for collective agreements could be 
distinguished.  
1) Normative content: Consisting of all the clauses directed at the 
final beneficiaries of the agreement (employers and employees included 
under its personal scope). That is, all working conditions (wages, 
working hours, leave, etc).  
The normative content also includes certain collective aspects. 
Specifically, the conditions governing the relationship between the 
employer and the workers' representatives in the company (for example, 
all matters relating to the meetings of the work councils, personnel 
delegates and union sections, the distribution of union information 
among the employees, the workers’ representatives right to a time-
credit, etc).  
3) Obligational content: consisting of all the agreement clauses  
directed specifically at the negotiators (not at employers and 
employees).  
A paradigmatic example of the collective agreement obligational 
content is the agreement of a “duty of absolute peace”.  This means 
banning strikes while the collective agreement is still in force. This 
possibility is expressly contemplated by arts. 82.2 and 86.3 WS. In 
addition, the Constitutional Court ruled that this ban in a collective 
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agreement is completely lawful and it does not breach the fundamental 
right to strike (Constitutional Court Ruling 11/1981 of 8 April, Legal 
Basis Num. 14th).  
  The conditions for terminating the collective agreement and the 
constitution and powers of the paritary commission14 are also good 
examples of the obligational content of the collective agreement since 
both are issues concerning its signatories.  
2.- Minimum content of the collective agreement.  
The collective agreement must necessarily contemplate the 
following five issues that constitute its minimum content (art. 85.3 WS):  
1) The parties who have negotiated it.  
2) Its personal, functional territorial and temporal scope. 
3) The  procedures to solve disagreements that may arise from the 
non-application of the collective agreement referred to in art. 82.3 WS, 
adapting the procedures regulated in statewide or Autonomous Region 
professional agreements governing labour disputes resolution.  
4) Form and conditions for giving notice of the termination of the 
collective agreement and the period in advance for such notice.  
5) Constitution of a paritary commission made up of both 
bargaining bodies which will be in charge of any issues entrusted by 
legislation and by the collective agreement. 
 
5.4.- The non-application of the working conditions regulated by 
the collective agreement (collective agreement “opting out”). 
This is one of the major issues which have been affected by the 
2012 labour law reform.  
As we know, one of the main characteristics of the “estatutario 
collective agreements is their general personal efficacy (erga omnes 
personal efficacy). The legal basis for such statement can be found in 
art. 82.3 WS: “The collective agreements regulated by this Law are 
binding upon all employers and workers included within their scope of 
application, throughout the entire time of their validity".  
 Nonetheless, art. 82.3 WS also regulates a major exception to the 
above rule. This exception seeks the possibility of a flexible regulation in 
the undertaking of certain working conditions established in the 
collective agreement. For this purpose, art. 82.3 WS provides a 
                                                             
14 The paritary commission shall be set up to solve the conflicts arising from the construing of the 
collective agreement clauses. 
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mechanism that allows any company, through an opt out workplace 
agreement, negotiated with the employees’ representatives, modifying 
the collective agreement working conditions in order to adapt it to the 
economic, productive or  organisational situation of the company. Thus, 
such workplace agreements are named by scholars “agreements for the 
non-application of the collective agreement” or “opt out agreements”.  
Art. 82.3 WS allows starting the procedure for the non-application 
of the collective agreement regardless of the scope of the collective 
agreement (no matter if it is a company collective agreement or if it has 
an upper scope). Prior to the 2012 labour law reform, which amended 
art. 82.3 WS seeking to ease its application, this procedure was only 
applicable to modify the working conditions of sectoral collective 
agreements. Nevertheless, nowadays, such limitation has disappeared 
from the regulation. Therefore it is possible to negotiate a collective 
agreement at a company level and, afterwards, to amend certain 
working conditions regulated therein through the art. 82.3 WS 
procedure.  
a) Grounds for the non-application of the collective agreement.  
The decision to trigger the application of art. 82.3 WS must 
always be adopted under a justified reason. According to art. 82.3 WS, 
the employer must prove the existence of “economic, technical, 
organisational or productive” causes for the non-application of the 
collective agreement. 
In order to ease the control of the existence of those grounds by 
the employee’s representatives, art. 82.3 WS defines each one:  
1) Economic causes concur "when the results of the company 
show a negative economic situation, in cases such as the existence of 
current or foreseen losses, or a persistent decrease in the level of the 
company revenue or sales”. Art. 82.3 WS states that, “in any case, the 
decrease shall be considered persistent if, throughout a period of two 
consecutive trimesters, the level of revenue or sales of each trimester is 
lower than the level reached in the same trimester of the previous year. 
- In short, the law requires the company to prove a negative 
economic situation. Nevertheless, notice that the persistent decrease in 
the level of the company revenue or sales is merely an example of such 
a negative economic situation since the precept says "in cases such as 
...". So, it is possible that many other circumstances (such as company 
debt levels, difficulties  for accessing to bank credits, customers 
defaulting, loss of customers, etc.) could also constitute economic 
grounds.  
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- According to art. 82.3 WS economic grounds can concur even if 
the company is obtaining a profit because it is enough to prove the 
existence of a "persistent decrease in the level of revenue or sales."  The 
regulation helps construe the adjective “persistent”, stating that the 
revenue or sales level has to be lower for two consecutive trimesters 
than the level reached during the same trimesters of the previous year. 
Nevertheless it would not be sensible to understand that these grounds 
can be declared regardless of the amount of the decrease, especially 
when it is insignificant.   
2) Technical causes concur when “changes occur concerning, 
among others, the means or the instruments of production”. The 
regulation is refers to cases such as, for example, the introduction of  
new equipment that would justify  altering certain working conditions. 
3)  Organisational causes concur when “changes occur, 
concerning, among others, staff systems and staff working methods or  
the way production is  organised". Consider, for example, the company's 
decision to outsource part of the production to another company.  
4) Finally, productive causes concur when “changes occur, 
concerning, among others, the demand for the products or services the 
company intends to place on the market".  
Notice that in the relations of production practice it is common to 
find that the situation which is facing the company is linked to two or 
more of the above causes. For example, the company decided to 
outsource part of its production with a Chinese company 
(organisational grounds) as a reaction to a negative economic situation 
(economic grounds).  
b) Collective agreement terms which allow an opt out.  
 Art. 82.3 ET does not allow a workplace agreement to amend any 
working conditions regulated in the collective agreement. It is only 
allowed to do so with regards to working conditions affecting certain 
matters listed in art. 82.3 WS. It is a comprehensive listing including 
major matters, which shows that the lawmaker sought to facilitate the 
application of art. 82.3 WS. Such matters are the following:  
a. Working days. 
b. Work schedule and working time distribution.  
c. Shift work legal regime.  
d. Compensation system and salary.  
e. Working and performance system.  
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f. Functions, where these exceed the limits set by Article 39 of 
this Law for functional mobility. 
g. Voluntary improvements to the protective action of the Social 
Security. 
c) Non-application of the collective agreement procedure: 
consultation period. 
As already mentioned, employers cannot proceed to opt out or 
waive the terms of the collective agreement unilaterally but, instead, 
they have to endeavour to reach a workplace agreement through a 
consultation period with the employees’ representatives. Art. 82.3 WS 
refers back to this procedure in art. 41.4 WS which also regulates a 
period of consultation with the employees’ representatives but in this 
latter case,  to allow employers to introduce substantial modifications of 
the working conditions of collective nature15.  
1.- With whom does the employer need to discuss the consultation 
period?  
According to art. 82.3, "with workers representatives entitled to 
negotiate a collective agreement under Art. 87.1 WS”. Therefore, the 
consultation can be carried out by the unitary workers’ representation 
(work councils or, where appropriate, personnel delegates) or with the 
union sections that have major presence in the unitary representation. 
The consultation period will be developed with either of these two 
representations. However, art. 41.4 ET (which is referred to by art. 82.3 
in order to regulate the procedure) gives preference to the latter ones 
(union sections) so they can negotiate if they decide to by the agreement 
of its members.  
2.-How can the consultation period be held in companies where there 
are no bodies of workers’ representatives?  
If, considering the company’s size, there are no workers’ 
representatives with which the consultation could be carried out16, art. 
41.4 WS provides for an alternative mechanism.  
                                                             
15 Notice that, although the procedure is almost the same, there is a strong difference between the 
substantial modifications of collective working conditions (regulated by art. 41 WS) and the non-
application of the collective agreement (regulated by art. 82.3 WS). Whilst the first one concerns the 
amendment of contractual working conditions (stemmed from the contract of employment or an 
extraestatutario collective agreement, the latter refers to the modification of the working conditions set 
by an estatutario collective agreement). 
16 Something which is not unusual, considering that in Spain there are many companies with less than 10 
workers.  
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In such cases, employees meeting in assembly may freely agree to 
attribute representation to either one of these two committees which 
would be constituted ad hoc:  
1) A workforce commission: that is to say, a committee composed 
of three employees of the company elected among and by themselves.  
2) A union commission: that is to say, a commission of up to 
three members appointed by the most representative trade unions and 
representative unions of the sector to which the company belongs.  
If the employees choose the union commission, art. 41.4 WS 
allows the employer to entrust his representation during the bargaining 
process to the employers’ association he is affiliated to. Surprisingly, 
such provision is not contemplated by the legal regulation when 
employees have chosen the workforce commission. 
3.-How long should the consultation period take and what is its 
purpose?  
Art. 41.4 WS states that the consultation period  will not last 
more than fifteen days. Therefore, there is a maximum term established 
in the law that seeks to accelerate the process, avoiding long bargaining 
periods. However, since no consequences have been established if such 
deadline is exceeded, nothing prevents consultations from lasting longer 
than fifteen days if both parties agree  in order to end the consultation 
with an agreement.  
 On the other hand, considering such a period is a deadline, it is 
not necessary to exhaust it because the parties may well reach an 
agreement before. In addition, art 41.4 WS empowers the parties, "at 
any time" (that is, before or during the course of the consultation), to 
replace the consultation period by the submission of the proposed 
amendment of the working conditions to the mediation or arbitration 
procedure applicable to the company. Therefore, in these cases, we 
must see what has been established by the national and Autonomous 
Regions’ agreements on the resolution of collective labour disputes, 
which usually regulate mediation and arbitration procedures.  
With regards to the purpose of the consultation period, art. 41.4 
WS sets out the following provisions:  
- The consultations will focus on “the reasons for the company’s 
decision and the possibility of preventing or reducing its effects, as well 
as the measures necessary to attenuate its consequences for the 
affected workers" (art. 41.4 WS).  
Therefore, it is not only and exclusively to exercise  control over 
the reasons for the employer’s decision but also to introduce measures 
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to alleviate it, such as, for example, setting a limit for the validity of the 
amendments, a plan for a gradual convergence towards the prior 
working conditions, or even the payment of compensation to any 
workers affected by the employer’s decision.  
- “During the consultation period, the parties shall negotiate in 
good faith with a view to reaching an agreement” (art. 41.4 WS).  The 
duty of good faith is a general principle of law which inspires the 
exercise of the parties’ rights and obligations during the employment 
relationship. To “negotiate in good faith with the purpose of reaching an 
agreement” does not necessarily imply the obligation to reach an 
agreement but the commitment of both parties to seek an agreement.  
4.- What can the result of the consultation period be? 
According to art. 82.3 WS, the consultation period may end with 
an agreement or with a disagreement, with different consequences in 
each case.  
a) Consultation period ending with an agreement.  
If an agreement is reached, art. 82.3 WS states that reasons 
invoked by the employers to support  their decision will be presumed. 
Consequently, the same article also states that the agreement can only 
be challenged before the social courts on the grounds of "fraud, deceit, 
duress or right abuse”.  
Thus, in the case of an agreement, the judge or court shall not 
make a validity ruling over the reasons invoked by the employer; the 
only option that claimants would have is to prove the existence of of 
fraud, deceit, etc., as mentioned above.  
Regarding the content of the agreement, it must:  
1)  Determine exactly the new working conditions applicable in 
the company.  
2) Determine the length of such new agreed working conditions. 
This is subject to a limit, since "it may not extend beyond the time when 
a new collective agreement is applicable in the company." In other 
words, it will last no more than the collective agreement the non-
application procedure of which has been triggered. 
Finally, art. 82.3 WS imposes two formalities to the parties when 
an agreement has been achieved:  
1.-The agreement must be notified to the collective agreement 
paritary commission since, as we know, such a body is responsible for 
the enforcement and the interpretation of the collective agreement.  
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2.-The agreement must be communicated to the labour public 
authority (the Labour Public Administration corresponding to the scope 
of the agreement) for the sole purpose of its deposit there.  
b) Consultation period ended with a disagreement. 
Art. 82.3 WS regulates several steps aimed at solving a 
disagreement during the consultation period.  
1) Disagreement submission to the collective agreement paritary 
commission:  
Firstly, any of the parties may submit the disagreement to the 
collective agreement paritary commission. Notice that this possibility is 
completely voluntary for the parties, that is to say, non-mandatory. In 
the event that the disagreement is submitted to the paritary 
commission, art. 82.3 WS establishes a maximum of seven days to solve 
the dispute.  
2) Conventional mechanisms for collective dispute resolution:  
When none of the parties has requested the intervention of the 
paritary commission or it  has not solved the conflict, they shall trigger 
the procedures for collective disputes resolution established in State or 
Autonomous Regions Collective agreements (agreements on specific 
matters17) which regulate this kind of mechanism18. 
3) Arbitration through the National Consultative Commission on 
Collective Agreements: 
According to art. 82.3 WS, if the above extrajudicial mechanisms  
have not solved the disagreement, (which would be impossible if the 
parties submitted it to arbitration, given the binding nature of the 
arbitration decision), its final resolution can be entrusted to the 
National Consultative Commission on Collective Agreements or the 
corresponding public body of the Autonomous Region19.  
The National Consultative Commission (or the equivalent body of 
the Autonomous Region) may solve the conflict by itself or entrust the 
                                                             
17 Vid. section 4.2 of this lesson. 
18 Do not forget that arbitration and mediation procedures for solving collective labour disputes are 
regulated in State and Autonomous Regions collective agreements which regulate this issue. For 
statewide conflicts the V National Agreement on Collective Labour Disputes Resolution is applicable, of 
07-02-2012 (BOE 23-02-2012), signed by CEOE and CEPYME, on the one hand, and UGT and CCOO, on 
the other. In the Valencian Autonomous Region the V Valencian Autonomous Region Collective 
Agreement on Collective Labour Disputes Resolution, of 02-06-2010 (DOCV 08-07-2010), signed by 
CIERVAL, UGT and CCOO-PV is applicable. 
19 if the opt out workplace agreement affects several company work centers located in different 
Autonomous Regions, the body empowered to carry out the arbitration is the National Consultive 
Commission. Otherwise, such body would be the equivalent in the Autonomous Region where the work 
centres are. 
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decision to an impartial arbitrator appointed by the Commission. Art. 
82.3 WS gives the Commission (or the appointed arbitrator) a maximum 
of twenty-five days to solve the conflict through arbitration. Such a 
deadline shall be counted from the date on which the dispute is 
submitted.  
The arbitration award from the National Consultative Commission 
(or the equivalent body of the Autonomous Region) will have the same 
legal efficacy as the workplace agreements reached through the 
consultation period. In addition, such arbitration award can be 
appealed before social courts following the proceedings provided by law 
to challenge collective agreements. 
 
5.5.- Length and validity of the collective agreement.  
Collective agreements are subjected to an expiration term since, 
according art. 82.3 WS, they are binding (upon all employers and 
workers included within their scope of application), “throughout the 
entire time of their validity”. Everything related to the length of the 
collective agreement is set out in art. 86 WS. The regulation in this 
aspect is, in summary, as follows:  
1) The parties set the length of the collective agreement.  
The collective agreement length is agreed by the parties. The 
parties may establish both the date on which it will come into force and 
(art. 90.4 WS) the period of its duration. (art. 86.1 WS). Even art. 86.1 
WS admits the establishment of different periods for different matters in 
the collective agreement. For example, the collective agreement 
regulation on wages often contemplates an annual revision of the pay 
scales according to the CPI (Consumer Price Index).  
Negotiators can also lawfully trigger the amendment of the 
collective agreement without waiting for the date of its termination. The 
2012 labour law reform, in order to facilitate the adaptation of the 
collective bargaining to the changes in the company’s productive 
activity, introduced this prevision in art. 86 WS.  
2) Express notice of termination.  
Having reached the final term established in the collective 
agreement, any of the parties who negotiated it shall give notice of its 
termination in order to end its validity (art. 86.2 WS).  
It should not be forgotten that form, conditions and time in 
advance for the termination notice of the collective agreement  are part 
of its minimum content (art. 85.2 d) WS). In this regard, collective 
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agreements frequently establish certain periods of time in advance for 
the notice of termination. It is even possible that the notice of 
termination is not needed in order to  cease the agreement being in 
force.  
3) Automatic extension of the collective agreement, unless otherwise 
agreed.  
If once reached the expiration term of the collective agreement, 
nobody gives notice of its termination, art. 86.3 WS establishes the rule 
of the automatic extension of the collective agreement for a year. This 
implies that the collective agreement shall continue in force for the next 
year and yearly until the notice of its termination is formally given.  This 
effect is the so-called "automatic extension" of the collective agreement.  
Among other effects, the automatic extension will determine that 
the concurrence legal prohibition (art. 84 WS) will persist during the 
length of the extension because the collective agreement will still be in 
force. Nevertheless, notice that, according to art. 86.3 WS, the 
automatic extension applies "unless otherwise agreed", which means 
that the collective agreement can lawfully set its automatic termination 
once its period of duration has been reached, without needing a notice 
of termination.  
4) Limited “ultra-activity” of the noticed collective agreement.  
If the collective agreement is lawfully given notice, the so-called 
“ultra-activity” (ultraactividad) will be triggered. According to art. 86 WS, 
once the collective agreement is given notice, during the negotiation of a 
new one the normative content of the previous one will continue in force 
and only the collective agreement clauses regulating a strike waiving 
during the validity of the collective agreement will no longer be in effect 
(obligational content).  
Ultra-activity is a situation of provisional validity of the collective 
agreement. This rule is aimed at avoiding regulatory gaps on working 
conditions while a new collective agreement is being negotiated. 
However, this rule is severely restricted in art. 86 WS, which subjects it 
to three major conditions:  
1) The ultra-activity rule only operates “unless otherwise agreed” 
because art. 86 WS says that the collective agreement validity “will 
operate in the terms established in the collective agreement". This 
implies that the collective agreement can lawfully regulate what content 
continues in force and what content does not during the negotiation of 
the new agreement. It can also lawfully set a limited period of time 
during which the collective agreement remains provisionally in force.  
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Hypothetically, even the collective agreement may establish the 
automatic expiration of all its content once it has been given notice of 
its termination.  
2) During the negotiation process, the parties may achieve partial 
agreements in order to adapt the content of the collective agreement to 
the production circumstances. Such agreements shall be decided by 
both parties.  
3) The parties shall solve the disagreements that may arise during 
the negotiation of the new collective agreement according to the 
procedures for collective labour disputes resolution regulated by State 
or Autonomous Regions collective agreements on this matter 
(agreements on specific matters). Such collective agreements must 
necessarily regulate the possibility of going to arbitration in these cases 
and, furthermore, they should establish its voluntary or mandatory 
nature. In the absence of express stipulation on this regard, art. 86.3 
WS states that the arbitration procedure will be binding.  
4) One year after the collective agreement notice of termination 
has been given and a new agreement has not been reached (nor an 
arbitration award has been laid down) art. 86.3 WS provides that the 
collective agreement will no longer be in force, unless otherwise agreed. 
In this case, the collective agreement of higher level will apply, if any. 
 
5.5.- Adhesion and extension of the collective agreement. 
The ordinary procedure by which a collective agreement comes 
into force requires, basically, that once an agreement has been reached 
by the individuals entitled to negotiate, it shall be registered and 
deposited before the Labour Public Authority and subsequently 
published in the Official Bulletin corresponding to its scope. Only from 
that point onwards, will the collective agreement be in effect.  
Along with this normal or ordinary procedure, art. 92 WS ET 
regulates two specific mechanisms through which a collective 
agreement may apply to a certain group of employers and workers who 
were not initially included in their personal scope.  
A) The adhesion.  
 Through the adhesion, the parties entitled to negotiate a collective 
agreement, instead of doing so, they may lawfully join a pre-existing  
one. 
 In order to establish an adhesion, three conditions shall be 
fulfilled: 
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1) The adhesion must be decided by individuals empowered to 
negotiate a collective agreement in the  respective scope.  
2) The decision of adhesion must be communicated to the Labour 
Public Authority for registration purposes, as if it were a new collective 
agreement. 
3) Art. 92 WS also requires the adhesion to be to the whole 
collective agreement. Therefore, it is not lawfully possible to adhere 
partially to a collective agreement (to only some of its clauses). This 
could be questioned since the parties are empowered to negotiate a 
whole collective agreement and therefore should be legally able to 
adhere partially to any collective agreement. In any case, this obstacle 
could be solved by the parties copying the parts of the collective 
agreement they choose (stepping aside the contents they are not 
interested in) and submitting it for registration to the Labour Public 
Authority as if it were their own collective agreement recently 
negotiated.  
B) Extension.  
Like adhesion, it is a legal mechanism that allows the application 
of a collective agreement to a particular group of employers and workers 
who are not initially included in its scope. But, unlike adhesion, 
extension is not decided by individuals empowered to negotiate a 
collective agreement, but  rather by the State or the Autonomous Region 
Labour Administration through an administrative act. Regardless, 
extension acts are not decided automatically (ex officio) by the 
Administration but must be requested by the stakeholders.  
The extension is therefore an administrative act by which the 
Labour Administration decides, at request of a party, to extend the 
provisions of a collective agreement to a plurality of workers and 
employers or a production sector or subsector.  
It is a mechanism aimed at avoiding a gap in the regulation of 
working conditions in those cases where an administrative intervention 
is justified. Consequently, art. 92 WS requires two conditions to proceed 
with the extension:  
1) The existence of a group of employers and workers or a 
production sector or subsector with no applicable collective agreement 
and who cannot negotiate a new one because there are no individuals 
legally entitled to do so.  
2) Such groups may be harmed by the impossibility of subscribing  
an own collective agreement. 
